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“Education is one of the fundamental human rights to which all people should have
access without discrimination. It should foster respect, solidarity, cooperation, dialogue,
consensus, tolerance, and inclusion as necessary values, celebrating cultural diversity,
rather than covering over those differences” – Rigoberta Menchu Tum, Nobel Peace
Prize Laureate 1992
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Introduction Part I: Abstract
In 2006, the State of Michigan passed Proposal 2, an amendment to the Michigan
Constitution which effectively banned affirmative action and race-conscious admissions
policies at Michigan’s public universities. Despite arguments that this policy placed an
undue burden on certain ethnic and racial minorities by suppressing their participation in
the American political process, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld Proposal 2 as
constitutional in the 2014 case Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action. This
thesis seeks to argue for the necessity of restoring the access to political participation
removed with the passage of Proposal 2, as well as present a convincing case that raceconscious university admission policies continue to exist as salient policy interventions
that minority groups should have the ability to advocate for. The following literature
review will first explore and contextualize the policy problem addressed in Schuette. Part
One will begin by briefly summarizing the arguments of the case through the dissent
authored by Justice Sonya Sotomayor and plurality opinion of Justice Anthony Kennedy.
Part Two will explore classical and contemporary scholarship on the issues of group
rights vs. individual rights and the field’s intersection with the majoritarian democracy.
These sources will range from Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics to Kymlicka’s
Citizenship in Diverse Societies. Drawing from this literature review, my thesis will move
towards a discussion which attempts to engage the question, “at what point is government
intervention necessary to ensure equal access to the political process for minority groups
in democratic societies?” Following this discussion, the work will seek to make a relevant
policy recommendation that may prove clarifying as the Court reexamines Fisher v.
University of Texas-Austin.
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Introduction Part II: Motivations
My motivations for the following thesis have stemmed directly from the
formative experiences lived during my past four years at the University of Mississippi.
Coming to Ole Miss, I found myself bewildered by the racialized climate that surrounded
me. A blessing of my upbringing that I had taken for granted was the multicultural
environment my parents had always sought to immerse me in, and the personal
worldview I had developed as a result. Between showing goats, forestry judging with my
local 4-H club, traveling as part of a multiracial violin performing group, and working at
the food bank with my siblings every other week, I was exposed to a variety of
perspectives and people groups from an early age. As a result, the fact that African
Americans still struggled to participate fully in campus life as equals was alarming to me.
The near de jure segregation of certain Greek houses and the de facto segregation of
dining environments such as the Ole Miss Student Union disheartened me and I found
myself confused about what my personal role was and could be as an agent of change.
The fact that so much remained to be done in a locale merely an hour from my hometown
only enhanced the immediacy of my desire to see my university as an inclusive place for
all who chose to pursue an education here.
During my sophomore year, student protests erupted on campus following the
reelection of President Barack Obama. I happened to be watching the election results
with a reporter for the Ole Miss student news broadcast, Newswatch, when word of these
demonstrations reached us. Wild claims of cars on fire and proverbial blood in the streets,
communicated via social media networks like Twitter, saw us running to our cars to take
an account of these events for ourselves. I will never be able to adequately describe the
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feeling in the pit of my stomach standing on a hill and watching the sea of my peers
below churn with animosity. While I found many initial reports of this incident had been
exaggerated, witnessing the hurling of racial epithets between students, the burning of a
black candidate’s campaign signs, and pickup trucks rolling by with Confederate flags
waving from the windows was enough to bring tears to my eyes. This was not what I
wanted. This was not the place I wanted to call home, nor the community I wanted to
claim as my family. In that moment I felt infinitesimally small and powerless.
As so often happens at the University of Mississippi, however, light seems to
shine most brightly in our darkest hours. The following night a candlelight walk was held
and attendance far outweighed that of the previous evening’s events. Arriving at the
center of campus, participants proceeded to collectively read the words of the Ole Miss
creed. As our united voices crescendoed over the words “I believe in respect for the
dignity of each person, I believe in fairness and civility,” my heart swelled. This was a
formative moment of my college experience. There was healing and there was hope. I
decided then that rather than merely espousing ideas of justice and inclusivity, I desired
to spend my time as an undergraduate student working alongside advocates for a more
unified campus environment. The progress I have witnessed and participated in
advancing since that night has been the privilege of a lifetime and one of the most
fulfilling pursuits of my life to date.
Of particular significance to me and relevance to this thesis was my involvement
in the Associated Student Body’s – the moniker of Ole Miss student government –
changing of the title “Colonel Reb,” the name for…, to the more culturally respectful and
inclusive “Mr. Ole Miss.” The ASB is modeled after the branches of the United States
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federal government and exists as three branches: executive, legislative, and judicial.
During my junior year I was elected by my peers to represent the College of Liberal Arts
as a member of the ASB Senate, the acting body of our government’s legislative branch.
While serving as a senator, I had the opportunity to dialogue with other student leaders
about ways to make our university a better place. The product of one of these dialogues
birthed the realization that our campus personality elections were not structured in such a
way as to encourage minority students to declare candidacy and meaningfully participate.
Ole Miss Personality Elections take place every fall, several weeks before the
Homecoming football game, to elect a Mr. Ole Miss, a Miss Ole Miss, a Homecoming
Queen, an assortment of Homecoming Maids, and those individuals chosen to be Campus
Favorites. The elections are as competitive as the campaigns are elaborate, with as many
as five thousand students casting ballots on Election Day. Specifically concerning the
roles of Mr. and Miss Ole Miss, elected candidates are expected to embody the spirit of
what is often termed the “Ole Miss Family.” These individuals normally run on a
platform of previous commitment and service to the university and a plan to represent
and serve all students while filling these desired roles.
In 2003, the University of Mississippi made the decision to remove Colonel Reb,
an elderly white man garbed in plantation-owner attire, as its official mascot. While the
mascot’s origins have been the subject of debate, the prevailing consensus has been that
the iconography of Colonel Reb represents the vestiges of antebellum white hegemony –
an ideology many Mississippians no longer identify with and find repugnant. However,
while the mascot was done away with, the position currently titled “Mr.Ole Miss”
remained under the appellation of “Colonel Reb.” Along with others, I found this

9

oversight to be inconsistent with the official stance taken by the University as well as the
Creed I had pledged to uphold. It is of interest to note that the student body of Ole Miss
had only ever elected two African American men to serve as Colonel Reb, both had
expressed the desire that the title not be used. Simply put we began to ask the question,
“what minority student is going to feel comfortable representing their fellow students if
the cost of doing so requires the humiliation and embodiment of the very figure who
historically oppressed their ancestors?”
Legislation was subsequently authored and we sought to pass a resolution
through the Senate as a means of ameliorating some of the racial disparities on campus.
We failed. While it is beyond the scope of this discussion to elaborate on the many
factors that played into the resolution’s failure, I believe it may be pithily described as a
case of “Our constituents do not want this. This is not the will of the majority.” This was
my first profound experience understanding that in order for democracy to work, limits
must sometimes be placed on the outcomes produced through majority rule. We decided
to approach the issue through another avenue and submitted a case to the ASB Judicial
Council, a veritable Supreme Court for student justice issues. The Council heard our case
and decided in our favor, that Colonel Reb violated portions of the ASB Code &
Constitution, and the council issued an order that it be changed. In the days following this
decision campus exploded with outrage. People felt their opinions had not been respected
and that it was patently unacceptable for the Council to force such a change upon the
community. These reactions bore many similarities to societal reactions we see today
when SCOTUS renders a culturally unpopular ruling. Nevertheless, in the eyes of many
justice had been served and few question the decision today.
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Interestingly enough, during my senior year I was honored to be elected as the
second ever Mr. Ole Miss. Through this experience I was able to see firsthand the
impacts that restructuring had on campus health and equity. As that year drew to a close,
I had several minority students approach me requesting advice on what running a
campaign for the position would look like and what they should expect should they
choose to declare candidacy. It was evident to me that, regardless of what the majority of
students on campus desired, this had been the right thing to do. I am reminded of
Professor Charles Eagles’ book on the integration of Ole Miss, The Price of Defiance.1 In
many ways I feel that Ole Miss and our nation as a whole are still working to open areas
of society that have been historically closed to disenfranchised groups. Sometimes
changes that promote the health of society require unpopular decisions. This is often the
position the Supreme Court finds itself in as it seeks to mediate the inevitable conflicts
that arise in multicultural democracies.
This knowledge must be balanced against a political system structured to be “of
the people, by the people, and for the people”2 and the inevitable tension that results
between for the people and by the people. The tension between individual rights and
group rights lies at the heart of what I am seeking to explore with this thesis. When is it
appropriate to trump the will of the majority in favor of fair treatment for the minority? I
hope to thoroughly examine this question within the context of the Supreme Court’s
ruling in its 2006 case Schuette v. The Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action.
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Introduction Part III: Structural Description
The following thesis will consist of three parts. In Chapter I, I lay out the
arguments of Justice Sotomayor and Justice Kennedy. While these Justices are not the
only members of the Court who delivered opinions in the case of Schuette v. The
Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action I have chosen these in particular for several
reasons. To begin with, only one dissenting opinion was delivered in this case, and thus,
it is the only one available for examination. At 58 pages, Sotomayor’s dissent was the
longest of her career to date, over three times longer than Justice Kennedy’s. Its length is
also one of the reasons I have made the unconventional decision to discuss it before the
plurality ruling. Sotomayor and Kennedy discuss the same precedent cases, but
Sotomayor offers more detail and context in her descriptions. Moreover, she takes time
over the course of her discussion to elucidate the political structure of the state of
Michigan and the way it affects the manner in which public universities are run.
Regardless of the argument this paper seeks to make, discussing Sotomayor ahead of
Kennedy provides a more clarifying foundation for effective analysis.
I have chosen Justice Kennedy’s opinion once again in part because of its length.
At 18 pages, Kennedy’s work provides more substantive analysis to engage than any
other authored by the justices ruling for the plurality. Justice Breyer’s opinion, for
example, leaves much to be desired, covering a scant 6 pages and almost punishing in its
brevity. Additionally, a review of other plurality rulings showed similar arguments across
the opinions. By analyzing Kennedy, I will argue the reader is able to engage the plurality
as a whole, and therefore draw conclusions for himself as to whether or not justice was
done with the passage of Proposal 2.
12

Chapter II of my literature review seeks to build a theoretical basis for the
argument that minority groups have common goals and require the ability to politically
mobilize towards the achievement of these priorities. Scholarship on individual and group
identity construction will be examined as well as the modalities of injustice in
multicultural democracies as various groups work to achieve goals that are sometimes in
conflict with one another. Such an understanding is essential to critically discussing the
Schuette case which will occur in the final chapter of this thesis.
Finally, Chapter III will return to the circumstances surrounding the case in
question and engage two particular arguments made by Justice Kennedy that I find
problematic. Based upon a review of the legal arguments of Justice Sotomayor and
Kennedy, and supplemented by contemporary scholarship, I will argue that an unjust
ruling was delivered in the case of Schuette v. The Coalition to Defend Affirmative
Action.
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CHAPTER I: CASE ARGUMENTS
Chapter I will consist of an overview of the arguments made by Justice
Sotomayor and Justice Kennedy in their delivered opinions regarding Schuette. The
objective will be to gain and clear and thorough understanding of the circumstances of
the case itself, as well as the arguments employed on both sides of the ruling.
Comprehending this will facilitate my critical analysis of the case itself as well as its
broader implications. Sotomayor will be summarized before Kennedy due to the length
and depth of her assessment of details critical to the case. Her more nuanced look at the
issues at hand will grant a broader understanding that will be beneficial when engaging
Kennedy’s more concise discussion for the plurality.

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR
Justice Sotomayor’s argument proceeds from a fundamental understanding that
purely democratic societies inevitably disadvantage minorities through certain policies.
As the second sentence of her dissent reads “without checks, democratically approved
legislation can oppress minority groups.” This is the reason for a Constitution, which
places limits on the decisions that the popular majority is able to make concerning
government and policy. Interpretation of these constraints is precisely the mission of the
Supreme Court of the United States and what Sotomayor seeks to do with her dissent,
summarized below. Her argument consists of three parts: an examination of relevant
SCOTUS precedent rulings, a summary of the events in question and political structure of
Michigan, and her own critical argument against the plurality ruling based on her
understandings of the political-process doctrine.
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Sotomayor begins with a historic overview of the various ways that racial
inequality was created in the United States, granting particular emphasis to the systemic
and institutionalized racism that continued after ratification of the 15th Amendment,
which granted African American men the right to vote. Her point is to illustrate the cases
in which popular referendum has sought to prevent racial minorities, particularly African
Americans, from participating in the political process. She points to precedent after
precedent in which SCOTUS has “reaffirmed the right of minority members to participate
meaningfully and equally in the political process.”3 Thus, when popular referendum
enacts policy which places a unique or special burden on particular minorities, making it
more difficult for them to participate in the political process, the Supreme Court is
compelled to rule in such a way as to rebalance the capabilities of all citizens to
participate in the political process. Sotomayor states “I firmly believe that our role as
judges
includes policing the process of self-government and stepping in when necessary to
secure the constitutional guarantee of equal protection.”4
Using precedent-setting cases relating to voting rights and desegregation of
schools, Sotomayor sets up a historical context that shows the court’s role in removing
institutional barriers that have historically prevented the participation of minority groups
in the political process. From here she proceeds to the crux of her argument, the politicalprocess doctrine. Full understanding of the political-process doctrine proceeds from two
key case precedents, Hunter v. Erickson and Parents Involved in Community Schools v.
Seattle School District No. 1 (hereto after referred to as Hunter and Seattle, respectively).

15

The rulings in these cases lay a foundation for understanding the rights of minority
groups regarding their participation in the political process.
In the 1969 case of Hunter, the city of Akron, Ohio had passed an ordinance to
combat housing discrimination by assuring “equal opportunity to all persons to live in
decent housing facilities regardless of race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin.”5
However, the majority of Akron’s citizens did not agree with the ordinance and, through
the process of popular referendum, overturned it. Moreover, the majority went further to
modify Akron’s city charter, stipulating that no future ordinances dealing with housing
discrimination could be passed without a majority vote of approval by the citizens of
Akron. Based on the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment, SCOTUS ruled to
overturn this change to the Akron charter because the change placed “special burdens on
racial minorities within the governmental process.”6 The court reasoned that because
extra obstacles were being placed in the way of minority groups from participating in the
political process, those same groups were being denied equal protection under the law, a
right specifically granted to them by the Constitution. The court went further to equate
the barriers created by the charter amendment to the barriers that would have been
created had Akron chosen to deny racial minorities the right to vote. The ruling showed
that not all cases of majority rule through popular referendum are appropriate or just. As
one opinion in the case summarized, “the sovereignty of the people is itself subject
to…constitutional limitations.”7
In the 2007 case of Seattle, the Court invalidated an initiative popularly approved
by the citizens of Washington state to end mandatory busing programs that had been
designed to aid in the integration of schools following the Court’s ruling in Brown v.

16

Board of Education. As with Hunter, the Court found the initiative violated the Equal
Protection Clause and placed “special burdens on racial minorities within the
governmental process” such that it was “more difficult for certain racial and religious
minorities…to achieve legislation…in their interest.”8
The rulings in these cases give us an understanding of the Court’s view of
constitutional allocations of power. The foundation of the political-process doctrine
demonstrates that no reallocation of power by a State or community electorate can serve
to impede the equal participation of a minority group in the political process, because the
equal participation is an essential right granted by the Equal Protection Clause. A pithy
summary of this idea would be to say that equal protection is equivalent to equal
participation. As the Court stated in Seattle “it is beyond dispute that given racial or
ethnic groups may not be denied the franchise, or precluded from entering into the
political process in a reliable and meaningful manner.”9 Moreover, both cases found that
when a non-neutral reallocation of power is racial in nature, jurisprudence dictates it must
be subjected to a different and more rigorous level of examination than other
reallocations of power. Sotomayor finds that, based upon these precedents, the
governmental action or political process outcomes violate the Constitution when they
have “(1) a racial focus, targeting a policy or program that ‘inures primarily to the benefit
of the minority or (2) alter the political process in a manner that uniquely burdens racial
minorities’ ability to achieve their goals through that process.”10 Her argument proceeds
by applying these principles in the case of Section 26, the portion of the Michigan
constitution altered with the passage of Proposal 2.
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By its very nature, Section 26 has the “racial focus” described above. The purpose
of affirmative action and race-conscious university admissions policies is to increase
access to higher education for minority students and thus, similar to desegregation, most
certainly “inure primarily to the benefit of the minority.” Considering degrees of racial
focus is important but is perhaps too fluid of a conversation to build a solid foundation
for concrete prescriptive arguments. More tangible are transfers of power and access to
participation. Sotomayor chooses to expend the majority of her dissent on the second half
of her defined principle, the special burdens placed on minority groups through the unjust
restructuring of the political process. To understand what she sees as an ineffective
restructuring of Michigan’s political process, an understanding of its original structure is
necessary.
Prior to the passage of Section 26, Michigan’s Constitution left absolute power
regarding decisions relating to the State’s public universities to each respective
institution’s governing board. These boards consisted of eight members and were in
control of, among other affairs, all admissions criteria, including the race conscious
criterion in question. The granting of this power was found in Michigan Constitution
Article VIII, Section 5 which established the Board of Regents of the University of
Michigan, the Board of Trustees of Michigan State University, and the Board of
Governors of Wayne State University. As Sotomayor states, by their very nature these
boards are “indisputably a part of the political process in Michigan.”11 Board members
come to hold office for an eight-year term via statewide political election. Sotomayor
points out that there is significant precedent for cases in which candidates would
incorporate their views on affirmative action admissions policies as part of their political
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platform. Thus, candidates were able to engage voters through their views on the matter
in question and voters were free to lobby for legislation that served their interests.
Following the enactment of Section 26, board members at Michigan’s public
universities retained exclusive authority in nearly all institutional affairs, as described
above, except for admissions criteria with a racial focus. This reallocation of power was
achieved through statewide popular referendum by the Michigan electorate in which the
constitutional amendment, labeled Proposal 2, by a 58% margin on November 7, 2006.12
The process of amending the Michigan Constitution is arduous. In order for a potential
amendment to become a ballot initiative it must garner either the support of two-thirds of
both Houses of Michigan’s Legislature or a number of voter signatures equal to 10
percent of the total number of votes cast in the most recent gubernatorial election. The
latter method proves to be even more difficult than it appears as more signatures are often
required, by as much as a 50% margin, to account for invalid or duplicate signatures that
often accompany citizen-sponsored ballot initiatives. Costs of promoting citizensponsored ballot initiatives are extreme, often amounting to hundreds of millions of
dollars.
In light of the principles espoused in Hunter and Seattle, such a restructuring of
the political process in Michigan proves problematic of Sotomayor. She finds that “while
substantially less grueling paths remain open to those advocating for any other
admissions policies, a constitutional amendment is the only avenue by which racesensitive admissions policies may be obtained.”13 She goes on to throw the conflict she
sees into sharper relief with a hypothetical.
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The effect of Section 26 is that a white graduate of a public Michigan university
who wishes to pass his historical privilege on to his children may freely lobby the
board of that university in favor of an expanded legacy admissions policy,
whereas a black Michigander who was denied the opportunity to attend that very
university cannot lobby the board in favor of a policy that might give his children
a chance that he never had and that they might never have absent that policy.14
Thus Sotomayor brings the point home that the restructuring of the political
process through Proposal 2 uniquely burdens racial minority groups in a manner that
violates the political process doctrine. The political process doctrine does not enshrine the
idea that minority groups are expected to come out ahead, or always achieve the
legislation they advocate for. What it is expected to protect, however, is the equal access
of all groups in American society to legislation advocacy, rather than intentionally
discriminate against select groups. The precedents of Hunter and Seattle are expected to
guarantee that all American citizens are supposed to play by the same rules in the
legislative process. Another precedent that illustrates the vital importance of protecting
minority rights comes with the case of United States v. Carolene Products Co. (hereto
after referred to as Carolene Products).
In Carolene Products, a case which centered around a law which banned certain
types of milk from being shipped between states for commercial purposes, a precedent
was established through the well-known Footnote Four, in which Justice Harlan Stone
stated that “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition,
which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be
relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more
searching judicial inquiry.”15 Stone’s words demonstrate that not only should there be
searching judicial review applied for the protection of all groups in society when it comes
to their access to the political process, but the scrutiny of jurisprudence should be applied
20

even more intensely. It is clear that the protection of access of the minority to the political
process is of tantamount importance for the health of society and effective democracy.
This is the heart of the political-process doctrine. Certainly autonomy and selfgovernment are essential to the functioning of American democracy, but as Sotomayor
points out through the precedents discussed above, they are not without limits, an idea
she feels the plurality is advocating for in their ruling on the Michigan case.
At the heart of Justice Sotomayor’s argument, and her fundamental disagreement
with the plurality, is the appropriate course of action for ending racial discrimination in
America. The excerpt of her opinion below encapsulates the essence of her dissent and
provides an appropriate conclusion to this summary of her opinion. She writes:
In my colleagues’ view, examining the racial impact of legislation only
perpetuates racial discrimination. This refusal to accept the stark reality that race
matters is regrettable. The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to
speak openly and candidly on the subject of race, and to apply the Constitution
with eyes open to the unfortunate effects of centuries of racial discrimination. As
members of the judiciary tasked with intervening to carry out the guarantee of
equal protection, we ought not sit back and wish away, rather than confront, the
racial inequality that exists in our society. It is this view that works harm, by
perpetuating the facile notion that what makes race matter is acknowledging the
simple truth that race does matter.16
JUSTICE KENNEDY
In comparison to the dissent in this case, the judgement of the Court, delivered by
Justice Anthony Kennedy, was much shorter, spanning only 18 pages compared to
Sotomayor’s 58. Justice Kennedy’s discussion proves less nuanced because, as he sees it,
it is not the Court’s place to answer many of the questions Justices Sotomayor and
Ginsburg found to be so crucial in this case. In principle, it first appears that Kennedy and
Sotomayor are on the same page with regards to the intent of this case. In his opening
statement, Kennedy begins by asserting “The Court in this case must determine whether
21

an amendment to the Constitution of the State of Michigan, approved and enacted by its
voters, is invalid under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States.”17 Beyond this stated intent, however, the justices
begin to part ways.
Justice Kennedy finds that this case should not have the focus of determining the
constitutionality of race-sensitive college admissions policies, but whether or not the
voters of Michigan should have the right to utilize popular referenda to make
governmental decisions regarding racially focused legislation. Kennedy uses a different
set of precedents to analyze this case, introducing several new cases not discussed by
Sotomayor, but also reinterpreting two of the pivotal cases discussed in the previous
section, Hunter and Seattle. The first on this list is Reitman v. Mulkey.
In Mulkey, a voter majority passed an amendment to the California Constitution
that barred the state from interfering in a private property owner’s decisions on whether
or not to rent or sell based on whatever criteria pleased them. Within the context of the
case, it was clear to the Court that this amendment was specifically passed with the intent
to perpetuate housing discrimination towards minorities. The Court ruled to invalidate the
amendment on these grounds because it served to cause “real and specific injury.”18
Next, Kennedy moves to examining the case of Hunter. To briefly restate our
summary of the events of this case from the previous section, citizens of Akron, Ohio
voted by popular referendum to overturn the City Council of Akron’s fair housing
ordinance. The Court moved to invalidate the majority’s decision and used the politicalprocess doctrine as one of its central arguments. Once again, the Court moved to this
ruling within the context of a racially-charged community where pervasive discrimination
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was occurring. Kennedy finds the contexts of Mulkey and Hunter to be at the heart of
contrasting the rulings of these precedents with the judgement he is delivering regarding
Proposal 2. Yet even Kennedy points out that in Hunter,
The Court found that the city charter amendment, by singling out
antidiscrimination ordinances, ‘places special burden on racial minorities within
the governmental process,’ thus becoming as impermissible as any other
government action taken with the invidious intent to injure a racial
minority…Hunter rests on the unremarkable principle that the State may not alter
the procedures of government to target racial minorities.19
We will recall that in the events of Seattle, a citizen vote passed an initiative to
end school bussing for the purposes of desegregating. In this case, as in Mulkey and
Hunter the Court saw this case as a case that was primarily motivated with the intent of
racial injury and discrimination. Such was the climate under which they delivered
judgement and overturned the statewide initiative. However, Kennedy believes Justice
Sotomayor’s reading and interpretation of Seattle is flawed.
In essence, according to the broad reading of Seattle, any state action with a
‘racial focus’ that makes it ‘more difficult for certain racial minorities than for
other groups’ to ‘achieve legislation that is in their interest’ is subject to strict
scrutiny. It is this reading of Seattle that the Court of Appeals found to be
controlling here. And that reading must be rejected.20
From this position, Kennedy moves into the explanation of his ruling. He makes
several points but among the most significant are i) that the plurality has found Proposal
2 was passed with “no infliction of a specific injury of the kind at issue in Mulkey and
Hunter and… Seattle,”21 and ii) overly sanctioning the interests of minority groups
perpetuates stereotypes and discrimination.
The plurality finds that the intent behind the majority vote in Michigan is not
comparable to the intent behind the policy changes at the centers of Mulkey, Hunter, and
Seattle. In the eyes of the justices concurring in judgement, we are “a society in which
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[racial] lines are becoming blurred.”22 They separate this case from the precedents in
question because “democracy has the capacity – and the duty – to learn from its past
mistakes; to discover and confront persisting biases; and by respectful, rationale
deliberation to rise above those flaws and injustices.”23
Because of societal progress since the Civil Rights era, Kennedy finds that the
“question is not how to address or prevent injury caused on account of race but whether
voters may determine whether a policy of race-based preferences should be continued.”24
The justices of the plurality seem to invest a faith in the American voter that our societal
consciousness has evolved to the point that personal biases no longer play distinct role in
our legislative decision making. The pith of his feeling appears to be that because the
Michigan majority (allegedly) did not intend to actively discriminate or cause racial
injury through their referendum, the outcome of their legislated decision must certainly
have a different impact. By making this point it would seem Kennedy is equating positive
intentions with positive impacts. That is to say, as long as the people of Michigan really
did not mean to inflict harm, then Kennedy argues that injury cannot exist.
Secondly, the plurality contends that acknowledging minority interests may do
more harm than good. Kennedy references one finding from the Court’s ruling in the case
of Shaw v. Reno in which the Court rejected the notion that “members of the same racial
group – regardless of their age, education, economic status, or the community in which
they live – think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the same
candidates at the polls.”25 The judgement regarding Proposal 2 finds it to be the
perpetuation of demeaning stereotypes that the dissent might insinuate that minority
groups have certain common interests on which they are united. According to Kennedy,
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under an expansive reading of Seattle, “racial division would be validated, not
discouraged.”26 When it comes to voting whether or not to incorporate racial-preferences
into the university admissions process “the holding in the instant case is simply that the
courts may not disempower the voters from choosing which path to follow.”27
As may be seen, this understanding is fundamentally at odds with the perspective
of Justice Sotomayor. The Court simply does not have the right to intervene in the
legislative process to such an extent that it prevents the majority from discussing and
ruling on certain issues. In Kennedy’s mind, intervention on the part of the judiciary
would perpetuate the prejudices that have plagued America society for centuries.
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CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW
We have now seen the major argument for the plurality centers around two key
points. The first point is the argument that it is racist in and of itself to acknowledge the
potential for racial groups to have common goals stemming from their racial identities.
The second point is the idea that malicious intent must be present in order for injury
deserving of judicial intervention to occur. The identification of these arguments
provided direction for my literature review and it is for this reason I have placed it as the
subsequent, rather than preceding chapter. In this chapter, I will review scholarship that I
hope to use to refute the arguments of Justice Kennedy. First, I will examine classical
philosophy regarding the nature of justice when it comes to group interactions. Second, I
will explore the formation of the racial identity within multicultural societies and
illustrate its salience to informing policy goals of various racial groups. Moving forward,
I will address the Kennedy’s second argument with a discussion of structural racism and
structural violence to demonstrate that malicious intent need not be present for flawed
institutions to impact minority groups negatively. Finally, I will take a brief look at the
empirical nature of racial disparity in the United States.
Aristotelian Ethics
Nicomachean Ethics
Nichomachean Ethics is the primary text used in defining the field of Aristotelian
Ethics. The work contains 10 books which cover a range of topics. Of particular interest
to us within the context of this literature review are the Doctrine of the Mean and
conceptualization of Rectificatory Justice. In Book II of Aristotle’s work Nicomachean
Ethics, he lays out the Doctrine of the Mean – the idea that justice exists when all are
given what is due them, and injustice when there is too much or too little assigned to a
26

particular group or individual.28 Later in Book V, Aristotle devises a means through
which such injustices may be redressed which he terms “rectificatory justice.”29 When
distribution of a good, privilege, or ability has not occurred in a just manner, rectificatory
justice may be employed as a method of what the United Nations would call “restoring
the dignity of the victim(s).”30
As the philosopher presents in Ethics, injustices occur in the form of involuntary
transactions. While Aristotle presents involuntary transactions in the more tangible forms
of theft and assault, the concept may be applied to more abstract circumstances such as
the deprivation of opportunity or theft of success. As our historical perspective
demonstrated, the African American community has been the subjected to a multitude of
involuntary transactions since the advent of slavery, some of which continue today.
Under Aristotle’s model, involuntary transactions and injustice may be identified
according to the Doctrine of the Mean, in which one party has more and another party
less than their given due. In these cases, rectificatory justice is necessary and should be
administrated by competent judicial intervention to restore what has been taken from the
disadvantaged party. In short what has been stolen must be transferred from the thief to
the victim of the theft. Applied to the field of race relations, we might interpret this
Doctrine to mean that racial minorities are the victims of injustice when they are not
given what they are due as individuals.
Politics
In Aristotle’s Politics, he states “no one will doubt that the legislator should direct
his attention above all to the education of the youth,” adding that, “since the whole
[society] has one end, it is manifest that education should be one and the same for
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all…[citizens] belong to the state, and are each of them a part of the state, and the care of
each part is inseparable from the care of the whole.”31 Taken together, it would appear
Aristotle has made a convincing argument for race-conscious university admissions
policies. Before drawing this conclusion, however, we must address a seemingly
contradictory discussion of merit in Politics Book 3, Part XII: the metaphor of the flautist.
Aristotle uses flute players as an example of why those who are the highest achieving or
most qualified should receive the greatest rewards, stating:
When a number of flute players are equal in their art, there is no reason why those
of them who are better born should have better flutes given to them; for they will
not play any better on the flute, and the superior instrument should be reserved for
him who is the superior artist. If what I am saying is still obscure, it will be made
clearer as we proceed. For if there were a superior flute player who was far
inferior in birth and beauty, although either of these may be a greater good than
the art of flute playing, and may excel flute playing in a greater ratio than he
excels the others in his art, still he ought to have the best flutes given to him,
unless the advantages of wealth and birth contribute to excellence in flute playing,
which they do not.32
Seemingly Aristotle is using this metaphor to argue for the meritocratic side of the
debate examined above. It is here that we must make an important distinction between
Aristotle’s discussions. As may be seen from the philosopher’s Book 8 discussion,
education is discussed as a nurturing process that grows individuals towards being
productive members of society. As such, it is only right that educational outcomes be a
primary concern of the legislator. In contrast, Aristotle’s Book 3 discussion of the flautist
sets a framework of individuals who have received all the training necessary to compete
in a competitive market, in this case the competition for the resource of the best flute.
Certainly there will always be talent and merit differences within society. This paper does
not seek to argue otherwise or encourage societal structure where all are confined to
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remaining on the same playing field. However, within the framework of the flute lesson,
this paper seeks to argue that while all may not be talented enough to receive the best
flute, all deserve the opportunity to receive quality flute lessons. For the sake of our
argument we will make flute lessons and their distribution analogous to the distribution
of education capital, specifically university admissions. Here, we separate the field of
affirmative action into separate spheres. The expressed advocacy for race conscious
university admissions policies and affirmative action in the workplace may be seen as
similar but different. By employing the political philosophies of Aristotle it is possible to
argue in favor of one without an obligation to defend the other.
Political Philosophy and Group Rights
Group Rights: Reconciling Equality and Difference
One principal philosophical issue that must be explored when considering
multicultural pluralism in the context of democracy is the concept of individual rights vs.
group rights. To some, the idea that these two ideologies can be reconciled seems to be an
oxymoron. Certainly when taken at face value, the ideas that some rights are extended to
all individuals while some are extended to others preferentially and yet both work to
promote equity in society seem to be at odds with one another. Such is the problem David
Ingram works to sort through in his work Group Rights: Reconciling Equality and
Difference. In particular, his work offers us useful definitions that we may utilize to
frame further discussion.
Ingram finds there to be two types of group-specific rights, those granted on the
basis of well-being and those granted on the basis of status. Well-being related group
rights include benefits such as those granted through social welfare programs. Individuals
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who are hungry, impoverished, or even homeless are granted certain rights in American
society that all do not have access to. In these cases, well-being is the exclusive
demarcation that determines right extension. It does not matter whether the individual in
question is a black man or a white woman, so long as they meet established criteria
demonstrating deficits in their well-being, they have the right to receive any number of
benefits such as Medicaid, TANF, or Unemployment Insurance. While the proportion of
these benefits is often a significant part of public discourse and debate among policy
makers, the actual existence of well-being group rights is rarely debated. We see helping
those who lack the base-line securities we have deemed essential to be our societal
responsibility and most often find our call to such work to be ensconced in our
constitution’s guarantee of “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” However, group
rights extended on the basis of well-being are not at the heart of the policy question this
thesis seeks to explore. Rather, we will focus our discussion on the second category of
group rights Ingram identifies, those conferred on the basis of inequity in societal status
of the individual.
Status-driven group rights stem from the base philosophy that minority groups
often require institutionalized protections against oppression from, or domination by, an
identified majority. Ingram names a variety of social constructs which distinguish
majorities from minorities including differences in “race, class, ethnicity, religious
orientation, gender, sexuality, and disability.”33 Part of social identity construction
requires the defining of the individual against a generalized other. The process of
categorization asks an individual to examine what groups they belong to and which they
do not and the differences in social status that result may require particular protections
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that ensure equity in societal interactions. Based on this distinction between group rights,
Ingram reflects “So these group-specific rights ostensibly advance the principle of equal
treatment. But how is this possible?”34 He finds the answer requires defining what exactly
“equal treatment” means.
In similar fashion, Ingram finds two definitions of equal treatment. The first is
both simple and straightforward; equal treatment means to treat everyone the same. The
second, in the author’s opinion, argues equal treatment means treating others differently
“in a way that respects their individual distinctness no less than their common
humanity.”35 Regarding these definitions, Ingram pulls them from John Rawls’ A Theory
of Justice and Ronald Dworkin’s Law’s Empire, respectively.36 Many use the first
definition we have identified as their basis for advocating for impartial laws, laws that
“advance only universal interests held by any rational individual, in complete abstraction
from all the particular interests that differentiate one individual from another.”37 Despite
this motivation, Ingram finds that because of the nature of differences in societal
differences, adopting a treatment strategy of “sameness” only works in some situations.
Universal treatment is a strategy that society has pursued in many situations
involving basic civil rights. Voting rights, the freedoms of speech and religion, and
marriage equality represent just a few of the social justice issues in which we have
determined that equal treatment of all individuals, or a strategy of sameness, results in the
greatest equity. We find that to prevent the favoring of a particular religious group, we
ask the government to limit its interaction with religious affairs, and many feel that
because such a strategy works in for certain policy issues it should be applied as a
political panacea for societal inequality. However, this is not the case in all pluralistic
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policy issues. Ingram summarizes the problem that arises from treating everyone the
exact same way, “not all persons find themselves in social circumstances that are equally
conducive to the full cultivation and exercise of their humanity, and some…have suffered
discrimination at the hands of other, more numerous and dominant groups because of
their particular differences.”38
Such disparity cannot be universally rectified without the creation of particular
exemptions from, or sanctions for, certain group-specific behaviors. The cases in which
universal treatment results in pervasive inequalities that fall along the categorical lines
such as race, gender, or religion reveal to us systemic discrimination within society.
Institutionalized domination of a minority group reveals the need for a nuanced approach
to the extension of specific vs. nonspecific group-specific rights. Ingram sees affirmative
action and other race-conscious policies to be a good example of necessary specific
group-specific rights stating,
Affirmative action rights enable women and minorities – who, statistically
speaking suffer systematic institutional discrimination in hiring, promoting, and
educational advancement – to compete for a fair share of scarce positions. In these
cases, we compensate persons for disadvantages that would otherwise prevent
them from equally exercising the same basic rights that the rest of us enjoy.39
Thus far we have made important delineations between types of group rights and
popular views of equal treatment. Ingram further nuances the discussion my proceeding
to define social injustice as discrimination vs. oppression. Oppression, he finds, “is
caused by a failure to distribute basic goods in ways that promote the equal treatment of
each person’s capacities.”40 Here, oppression relates to the well-being rights discussed
above. When individuals are denied rights or goods we have determined to be essential
for well-being, such as food, shelter, or education, we consider this individual to be
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oppressed. Policies that promote or facilitate oppression are evidenced by individuals
who do not receive and equal share of social output, be it in the form of goods or
opportunities, despite equal individual contribution to the collective labor that creates
such output in the first place.
Domination differs from the previous definition because it “is caused by a failure
to recognize all citizens as free, responsible human beings worthy of equal respect…[and
involves] hierarchies of decision-making of power that prevent some persons from
exercising control over their lives.”41 Ingram identifies five categories of domination:
economic, political, legal, social, and cultural. Rarely do we find single-category
dominations within American society, and these categories have historically converged to
create many of what we now identify as the greatest injustices of our nation’s history,
such as Jim Crow laws. Domination is dangerous, Ingram states because it is closely
linked with being “denied recognition as a human being” and feeling “diminished in
[one’s] capacity as [a] rational decision-maker.”42 The author ends his discussion by
pointing out that, while different, oppression and domination often go hand-in-hand and
one often facilitates the other. Economic domination through the institution of slavery
often allowed oppression in the form of inhumane treatment.
The sources of social injustice fall into two categories: systemic and identitybased. As their names suggest, systemic injustice finds its origin in a system or institution
while identity-based injustice is caused as a direct result of an individual’s identity or
group membership. Systemic injustice does not discriminate and may affect any
collective of individuals. For example, systemic poverty resulting from capitalism is
color-blind, gender-blind, religion-blind, etc. and can affect any member of society.
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Identity-based discrimination results in many of the more common social injustices
common in the societal discourse of today such as racism, sexism, homophobia, and
xenophobia. Certain groups are the victims of exclusively systemic injustice, others are
affected by only identity-based injustice, while still others find themselves in the
maelstrom of social injustice stemming both from institutions and their identities. The
latter represents the circumstances of certain racial minorities in the United States.43
Eliminating injustice, then, sometimes necessitates a bifurcated policy solution to
address dual causes. For example, ensuring equal access to educational advancement for
African Americans does not heal the wounds of racism if identity-based discriminations
are not addressed as well. Conversely, affording a racial minority the respect the group
deserves does nothing to address the systemic problems which keep the group in question
locked in pervasive poverty.44 As Ingram points out, however, such solutions can seem
confusing and difficult to develop because they simultaneously call upon our earlier
conceptions of “equal treatment.” When individuals are treated in the exact same way,
Ingram’s first definition, we create a solution to identity-based social injustice. However,
when individuals are treated with difference in mind to create more equitable outcomes,
as Ingram’s second definition proposes, we see policy solutions that address systemic
social injustice. But how can these treatments be reconciled for groups who fall victim to
both types of injustice? How is it possible to treat a group in the exact same manner as
other groups yet in a different manner from other groups at the same time?
Ingram concludes the useful definitions and framework he has developed for
thinking through our policy problem in question by juxtaposing affirmative policies
solutions against transformative strategies. Affirmative remedies typically only target
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oppression by redistributing goods and opportunity in society rather than directly
targeting the power disparities that create discrimination. Regarding affirmative
remedies, the author states that they
Work within the systemic and identity-based injustices of our current
society…[and] take for granted the existence of a capitalist economic system and
a fixed order of racial and gender identities. Thus they mitigate – but do not
eliminate the social injustices that arise within this system and order. In short,
they perpetuate differences of class, race, and gender.45
Conversely, transformative remedies radically seek to equalize societies by dismantling
private institutions and cultural identity constructions that create the hierarchies that
cause discrimination. Neither remedy is perfect and both present their own unique
problems.
Regarding affirmative remedies, we have already seen a significant objection to
their implementation is that they perpetuate categorization of the individual in the social
constructs that have caused him or her to face discrimination in the first place. They
perpetuate their own forms of sexism, racism, and other problematic views when they
assume that one’s group membership informs one’s desires or behavior.46 Conversely,
transformative remedies toss identity politics aside. Biologically speaking, group barriers
do not matter and pragmatic solutions to inequity show no regard for them. Not only this,
transformative policies would more closely mirror communism or socialism, rather than
the democratic political institutions we as a society have chosen to govern ourselves.
Because of the previous concern in addition to the fact that socially constructed group
barriers have thus far served society well as a means of organization and prevention of
chaos, policies that represent transformative remedies are unlikely to be implemented.47
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Ingram leaves us with a clear picture of the policy problems we face when it
comes to social injustice. He identifies their various causes and creates a helpful
framework for discussing their possible rectification. However, the author’s discussion
leaves us asking several questions. Is their worth in the field of identity politics? Are all
social constructs bad? And, most relevantly to the discussion of this paper, are
affirmative remedies of any use to us if they represent an incomplete solution?

Citizenship in Diverse Societies
Given the above discussion, we are confronted by an argument against affirmative
remedies that is brought up both by Ingram and the plurality in the Michigan case. In the
discourse of American politics and how best to represent the interests of citizens, some
policymakers and philosophers would state that presuming an individual to hold certain
ideological stances strictly based upon his or her physical characteristics is in and of itself
discriminatory. Relating specifically to the topic of race, the Supreme Court stated in
Shaw v. Reno that it was impermissible to assume that “members of the same racial group
– regardless of their age, education, economic status, or the community in which they live
– think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the
polls.”48 To be sure, it would be ludicrous to see a member of a racial group on the street
and draw explicit assumptions regarding said individual’s ideological tendencies. The
question then becomes, what is the role of race in determining the ways in which an
individual participates in the American political process? This is one of the questions
Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman seek to address in their compilation of essays
Citizenship in Diverse Societies.
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Cultural Identity and Civic Responsibility
In his essay Cultural Identity and Civic Responsibility, Jeremy Waldron openly
admits that existing in a multicultural democracy necessarily involves sacrifice on the
part of all citizens involved. To Waldron, civic responsibility means
(1) participating in a way that does not improperly diminish the prospects for
peace or the prospect that the inhabitants will in fact come to terms and set up the
necessary frameworks and…(2) participating in a way that pays proper attention
to the interests, wishes, and opinions of all the inhabitants of the country.49
If this definition seems uncontroversial it is because, as Waldron acknowledges, its
language is vague and open to interpretation. The precise definition of what equates to
“proper attention” and what does not undoubtedly generates a myriad of definitions
nearly as diverse and the author’s readership. Waldron finds that the most appropriate
place to begin answering the “proper attention” question is in the light of understanding
cultural identity.
Individual identity construction begins with the recognition of boundary markers.
Simply put, we know who we are by looking at what we are not. Defining oneself against
a generalized other inevitably leads one to find difference and commonality with various
collectives in the context of multicultural society. Whether artificial or natural, identity
markers such as gender, race or ethnicity, and religion inform both our experience and
interpretation of experience while living alongside other members of the nation state.
According to Waldron, it is the interplay between these characteristics and the particular
social environment, rather than the explicit characteristics themselves that inform the
individual experience. An example would be to acknowledge that the individual
experiences and perspectives of a traditionally conceptualized “black person” who is a
native of Ethiopia may be radically different than those of an African-American, despite
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their shared identity marker. To this end, Waldon postulates that “people forge their
identities in the crucible of the nation, culture, or ethnos in which they are reared or
raised.”50 Because individual identities are defined in the context of a social collective,
they have a collective nature, and can be shared among individuals. Just as identity
markers can define difference, they have the power to solidify similarity and mobilize
individuals to achieve mutual goals. Indeed, the importance individuals place on their
collective identities often supersedes their prioritization of their individual conception of
the self. Waldron elaborates, stating “the most common basis for the most egregious
affronts to people’s identities is thought to be hatred of a particular culture or ethnicity
rather than disrespect for the particular identity an individual has crafted for himself
within his culture or ethnicity.”51 Identity politics then, becomes a complex network of
group interactions in which the stakes are high. The outcome of these interactions in
multicultural democracy determines the allocation and distribution of social resources
and opportunity.

The Case for Affirmative Action on Campus: Concepts of Equity, Considerations for
Practice
Thus far we have discussed the potential for phenotypic differences between
individuals to become the identity boundary markers of the psyche, leading to social
collectives that may have common interests and goals. For the purposes of our discussion
we have extrapolated this principle to argue that racial minorities in the United States
qualify as discreet groups that have common political goals. The burden of proof in our
discussion now demands we illustrate probable cause that a common political goal of
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racial minorities would be increased representation in the realms of higher education.
Exploring this concept is one of the tasks undertaken by the editors of The Case for
Affirmative Action on Campus: Concepts of Equity, Considerations for Practice.
A fact that is without contest in the affirmative action discourse is that, in
comparison to white students, African American, Hispanic, and other disenfranchised
students have not participated in postsecondary education at the same rates. The authors
postulate this is the result of barriers that have prevented racial minorities from accessing
the same educational and cultural capital as mainstream Americans. These barriers
include “financial constraints, academic deficiencies, and poor standardized test
performance” and as a result “certain groups of individuals have not found traditional
baccalaureate degree education readily available.”52
Universities are important places because they give an individual access to
capital, which the authors define as “an ability to generate wealth and promote means of
production through social relationships.”53
Rethinking Racism: Towards a Structural Interpretation
While race may possess psychological origins and find itself rooted in the
arbitrary selection of identity markers, it is not merely a psychological phenomenon. In
his paper Rethinking Racism: Towards a Structural Interpretation, Eduardo Bonilla-Silva
argues that scholarly research has not gone far enough to interpret racism within a
structural framework and it should instead be viewed as “the ideological apparatus of a
racialized social system.”54 Bonilla-Silva defines racialization as the “social creation of
racial categories” and contends that this process influences the way societies are
structured. Theorizing the nature of these structural shifts is of critical importance to the
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author. Bonilla-Silva addresses problems with the dominant scholarly view of racism,
highlights the importance of what he terms “racial contestation,” and proposes a new
interpretation of the nature of racism that he believes will help combat “New Racism.”
Thus far, Bonilla-Silva finds scholarly interpretation of racism has fallen largely
within the definition established by Ruth F. Benedict in her 1942 work Race and Racism.
Benedict defines racism as “the dogma that one ethnic group is condemned by nature to
congenital inferiority and another group is destined to congenital superiority…It is, like a
religion, a belief that can only be studied historically.”55 The figure below illustrates what
Bonilla-Silva introduces as the “idealist” view.56

This formulaic presentation of “idealist racism” demonstrates an understanding of
racism as progressing from individuals’ independent discriminatory views and
progressing to racist action. However, perceiving racism in this manner reduces the field
to a segment of social psychology57 and proves problematic for several reasons. BonillaSilva cites the work of William Julius Wilson to demonstrate that, more than a set of
ideals, racism causes – and is replicated through – structural changes in a society. Wilson
describes these shifts stating,
…as American racial history so clearly reveals, racial norms tend to change as the
structural relations between racial groups change. And the main sources of this
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variation have been the alteration of the system of production and changing
policies of the state.58
Merely viewing racism as an ideology limits discussion in a way that hinders our
ability to analyze its impact on society. Bonilla-Silva offers a list of weaknesses he finds
in the idealist perspective:
1. Racism is excluded from the foundations or structure of the social system59
2. Racism is ultimately viewed as a psychological phenomenon to be analyzed at the
individual level60
3. Racism is treated as a static phenomenon61
4. Analysts defining racism in an idealist manner view racism as “incorrect” or
“irrational thinking” and thus label “racists” as irrational actors62
5. Racism is understood as a matter of overt behavior63
Defining racism as the collective impact of individual, psychological views grants
immunity to social institutions from the label of “racist” and keeps the structures of the
state from being explicitly defined by the pejorative. Bonilla-Silva believes a society
plagued by racism retains racist institutions as a component, rather than an exclusive
composition of racist individuals. Moreover, racism need not be considered a deviant
psychopathology because institutions performing racist action are often rational actors.
Finally, racism in many cases may have a covert manifestation rather than over action
such as lynching or hate speech. A structural interpretation of racism is required to
incorporate the contemporary realities of discrimination in a multicultural democracy
such as the United States.
Challenges to the idealist perspective arose in the decades following its
conception, but failed to take pervasive hold in academia. Arising from the Civil Rights
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Movement of the 1960s, the institutionalist perspective found the need to separate overt
and covert racist action. In their book Black Power, scholars Carmichael and Hamilton
defined racism as “the predications of decisions and policies on considerations of race for
the purpose of subordinating a racial group and maintaining control over that group.”64
Moving away from the micro-perspective of individual-to-individual interaction, the
institutionalist perspective took a macro-perspective that recognized “institutional
racism,” or “the covertly racial outcomes produced through the ‘normal’ operations of
American institutions.”65 Jim Crow law provide an excellent example for ways in which
mechanisms of the state were able to keep minority groups subjugated. While the
institutionalist perspective made valuable contributions to academic dialogues
surrounding racism, the majority oppressor group is still assigned a psychological sense
of superiority.66 Because of these ideological underpinnings, Bonilla-Silva argues the
institutionalist perspective does not go far enough in its departure from the idealist
perspective, necessitating further reinterpretation in academe.
The Civil Rights Movement serves as one of many examples in which societal
conflict has centered on the boundary marker of race. The ability for racial groups to
politically mobilize has historically proven essential for the promotion of justice and
equitable distribution of resources in American society. The Black Lives Matter
movement makes readily apparent the contemporary importance of such mobilization.
When the nature of social strife precipitates a “distinct racial character,” Bonilla-Silva
postulates the action should be categorized as racial contestation.67 Racial contestation is
defined in the literature as “the struggle of racial groups for systemic changes regarding
their position at one or more levels.”68 Many forms of contestation in society occur on an
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individual level, with disconnected actors and discordant action. However, when the
nature of contestation becomes collective and cohesive, systemic changes in social
structure become more likely to transpire. Further, in the case of racial contestation,
fundamental change cannot occur unless “the struggle reaches the point of overt
protest.”69 According to Bonilla-Silva, overt protest through racial contestation serves as
the mechanism to combat covert manifestations of contemporary racism. In the absence
of history’s overt racist action, combating modern structural racisms necessitates the
organization of minority groups and advocacy for systemic change. Summarily, “racial
contestation is the logical outcome of a society with racial hierarchy.”70 The figure below
illustrates the role racial contestation plays in social dialogue.71

Moving towards a structural view of racism offers several advantages over the
idealist perspective, as enumerated by Bonilla-Silva.
1. Racial phenomena are regarded as the “normal outcome” of the racial structure
of a society72
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2. The changing nature of what analysts label as “racism” is explained as the
normal outcome of racial contestation in a racialized social system73
3. A structural framework allows analysts to explain overt as well as covert racial
behavior74
4. Racially motivated behavior, whether the actors are conscious of it or not, is
regarded as “rational,” that is, as based on the different interests of the races75
5. The reproduction of racial phenomena in contemporary societies is explained in
this framework by reference not to a long distant past but to its contemporary
structure76
Structurally framing racial dialogues nuances the discussion of contemporary
racism in a manner befitting the obstacles that remain in modern multicultural
democracies such as the United States. Bonilla-Silva spends a chapter contextualizing the
historic progression of racialization in the United States. He begins with the conquest of
native lands and chattel slavery, moves through Jim Crow and the Civil Rights
movement, and arrives at the present which labels as the era of “New Racism.”77 While
the Great Migration of African-Americans from the rural, segregated South to the more
open-minded North allowed the “successful challenge of their socioeconomic position,”78
previous and current disparity in the allocation of social and cultural capital has resulted
in persistent structural obstacles for minority groups in the United States. Housing
discrimination, racialized wage gaps, and a host of other formative phenomena
demonstrate contemporary racism still plays a role in American society, despite its covert
nature.79 Racial contestation and symbolic incorporation of minority groups have largely
extinguished culturally-acceptable overt racism. The structural obstacles that remain fall
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under Bonilla-Silva’s category of “New Racism.” The following figure illustrates the
argued progression and current character of the racialized social system of the United
States.80
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In short, through Rethinking Racism, Bonilla-Silva proposes we need a less static
view of racism. As culture shifts and the nature of obstacles to racial harmony evolves,
we should examine the impacts of structural inequalities rather than view racism as
merely a psychological perversion. The power of social and political institutions to
perform and replicate contemporary racisms must be acknowledged if amelioration of
inequities and pursuit of justice are to be achieved. Finally, understanding the essential
functional role of racial contestation in cultural dialogue, appropriate jurisprudence
should refrain from suppressing the ability of minority groups to mobilize around their
existent, shared goals.
For Discrimination
We have thus far traced the theoretical bases and foundations that have motivated
minority and marginalized groups to historically mobilize. It is a fact of this history that
affirmative action has been employed for several decades as a strategy to rectify
disparities in educational and social capital between these groups and the majority. On
the whole these methods have attempted to apply a salve of equity to the painful social
wounds of racism and discrimination, and in their pursuit have met with some degree of
success. Yet some theorists believe there is a better way to mitigate the discord between
racial groups: colorblindness. Have we outgrown affirmative action and entered into a
post-racial society? Is adopting a philosophy of colorblindness a viable policy alternative
for the present and the future? These are two of the questions Randall Kennedy seeks to
answer in his book For Discrimination: Race, Affirmative Action, and the Law.
“All men are created equal” are the words held so dear by the American populace.
They represent the aim and longing – at least in theory – of our collective hearts for unity
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among those who choose to build a life here. However, we vary in our interpretation of
what the execution of this idea looks like in practice. Kennedy begins his chapter “The
Color-Blind Challenge of Affirmative Action” by attaching several broad labels to
competing ideologies of equality as they pertain to colorblindness. To begin with, there
are those who favor the employment of colorblindness and those who do not. As we have
seen at the outset of this paper through the words of Justices Roberts and Sotomayor, the
divide of opinion reaches to the highest realms of power and intellect within our society.
Kennedy breaks down the colorblindness advocacy camp further into two subsets: the
colorblindness gradualists and the colorblindness immediatists.81 Gradualists are pithily
described as identifying with Justice Harry Blackmun’s quote “in order to get beyond
racism, we must first take account of race”82 while immediatists are more drawn to the
words of William Van Alstyne:
One gets beyond racism by getting beyond it now: by a complete, resolute, and
credible commitment never to tolerate in one’s own life – or in the life or
practices of one’s government – the differential treatment of other human beings
by race…[this] is the great lesson for government itself to teach: in all we do in
life, whatever we do in life, to treat any person less well than another or to favor
any more than another for being black or white or brown or red, is wrong.83
Not all immediatists think affirmative action has been an inherently flawed
practice, Kennedy points out. Of those favoring an immediate move to standardized
treatment of all individuals, some believe affirmative action has been an effective
intervention in the past, but does more harm than good in modern society.84 What we are
left with is a vast spectrum of ideologies that range from “this was never a good idea” to
“this is an idea that should never be challenged” to somewhere in between. Where along
this continuum does justice reside?
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Colorblindness, when described simplistically, bears what American political
journalist Michael Kinsley refers to as the “bumper sticker advantage.”85 “Treat everyone
the same” is a short, simple concept – one which might be easily translated from theory
to practice and casts off the cumbersome gradations of reconciling our simultaneous
common humanity with innate individual difference. We see this to be a philosophy that
has been applied by the Court for many years with varying degrees of success. While
current societal consensus has rendered “separate but equal” to be deplorable, the words
of Justice John Marshall Harlan in his Plessy v. Ferguson assent of 189686 ring eerily
similar to arguments used by the Court today – over a one hundred years later – to guide
discussion on justice in a multicultural society.87 Kennedy cites a litany of Supreme Court
cases in which constitutional colorblindness has been referenced as a bedrock principle in
rulings that in practice perpetuated discrimination against disenfranchised groups. These
cases include Plessy v. Ferguson which upheld “separate but equal” practices across the
country, Korematsu v. United States which found no fault with the domestic internment
of Japanese Americans during World War II, and Swain v. Alabama which affirmed
racially discriminatory jury selection processes.88 In the words of Kennedy, when it
comes to constitutional colorblindness there is historic reason for “skepticism regarding
the capacity of courts to suitably distinguish between permissible and impermissible
types of racial discrimination.”89
While many of these grievous oversights in the execution of justice were
corrected by subsequent rulings by the Court, it remains clear that, as an ideology,
colorblindness can enhance rather than reduce discriminatory treatment of the
marginalized. While broad legal principles and platitudes are necessary to standardize
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implementation of the law in such a large country, a myriad of examples exist that
demonstrate exceptions to these models of justice simply cannot be applied in every
situation. Kennedy points to the words of Professor Nathan Glazer:
General principles that mean justice are often suspended to correct special cases
of injustice, as when the immigration laws are suspended to let in a body of
political refugees, or moneys are made available to those suffering from floods or
other disasters. Negroes are victims of a man-made disaster more serious than any
flood.90
What Kennedy is advocating for is an acknowledgement that strictly applied
colorblindness is overly simplistic in its vision for a just America. While the discussion
of whether or not the United States will ever become a post-racial society is beyond the
scope of this thesis, Kennedy’s work demonstrates that colorblind immediatists currently
sitting on the bench represent an invidious threat to justice across the country. At least for
now, colorblindness also renders us sightless to the racial discrimination it perpetuates.

Violence, Peace, and Peace Research
Thus far we have referred to the negative impacts of exclusion and
marginalization with terms such as “discrimination” or “injustice.” However, some
scholars might describe navigating dialogue in this manner as a conversation for
milquetoasts. Indeed, in his work Violence, Peace, and Peace Research, sociologist
Johan Galtung postulates that in many instances the negative impacts we have been
discussing can, and should, be referred to as acts of violence, and for our purposes –
“structural violence.” In his defining of violence, Galtung states “violence is present
when human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental
realizations are below their potential realizations.”91 Summarily, violence is “the cause of
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the difference between the potential and the actual.”92 When social and political
institutions begin to engage in behaviors and decisions that limit, directly or indirectly,
the autonomy of individuals in living their desired human experience, we may say that
structural violence is present. He arrives at the following typology of violence:93

Conceptualized here is the idea that violence does not strictly refer to physical,
injurious acts, but can take a variety of forms. Violence involves an actor, an object to be
acted upon, and the action itself. Galtung explicitly describes social injustice as has been
described throughout this literature review as a form of violence.94 Describing violence as
limiting of autonomy to realize potential shows that the disenfranchisement of minorities
and shifting of power structures to exclude particular groups can be described as nothing
short of brutality.
Race, Structural Violence, and the Neoliberal University: The Challenges of
Inhabitation
While Galtung defines structural violence in the broad sense, a study by Jennifer
Hamer and Clarence Lang proves instructive when we conceptualize the reality of
structural violence in the university environment. In Race, Structural Violence, and the
Neoliberal University: The Challenges of Inhabitation, the authors offer a compelling
directive that talking about the existence of racial disparity neither ameliorates historic
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discrimination nor promotes inclusivity. In conducting their examination of structural
violence in the campus setting, Hamer and Lang intentionally link its existence with a
neoliberal context. The study defines neoliberalism as “the economic and social
philosophy that imposes free-market fundamentalism on all human interaction.”95 The
authors focus on Irit Rogoff’s idea of “inhabitation” in scholarship, the study of a
scholar’s relationship to his or her subject of study.96 The main thought is that researchers
often conduct projects within the physical environment of academia with an outward
focus but rarely pause to understand their relationship with these subjects as they affect
institutions of higher education. As minorities face obstacles in American society, the
authors find is essential that we understand how these obstacles are replicated in the
college setting. Hamer and Lang contend that “rather than than simply intervening ‘in the
world,’ so to speak, scholars who write against structural violence must inhabit their
research by fostering… ‘insubordinate spaces’ that unsettle existing power relations and
promote meaningful racial equity and access in the halls of academe.”97
Neoliberalism in Academe
Hamer and Lang track the character of disparity in American society through
black-white wealth gap origins and racialized perceptions of poverty. From the roots of
discrimination to the rise of the black lower to lower-middle class during the 1970s and
beyond,
The black working-class poor have served as a potent condensation symbol in
popular white anxieties and resentments regarding race, class, gender, deviance,
and dependency…through this framing, black people are fashioned as predatory
‘takers’ threatening the independence and safety of virtuous white ‘makers’ –
hence the latter’s indifference to police misconduct in black communities…in this
manner, race has performed the dirty work of justifying the retrenchment of the
social safety net, promoting a reactionary white fortress mentality.98
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In the view of Hamer and Lang, the racial climate of American society today
remains far from Justice Kennedy’s “blurred lines.”99 Localizing to the cultural
microcosm that is the American university, the scholars postulate that structural violence
is pervasive. According to a study as recently as 2012, African Americans and Hispanics
are found to be less likely to attend or complete college despite the fact that parents of
these minority groups were measured as more likely to hold their children accountable
for homework than white and Asian American parents.100 Among 9th graders surveyed,
African Americans reported ambitions to complete a bachelors or professional degree in
higher numbers than their white peers. As the authors conclude, “the critical point is that
successful outcomes in higher education are not simply about valuing education, but also
a matter of resources and campus environment.” Whereas black students were already
more likely than their fellow white students to work 15+ hours a week and take on debt to
pay for school, African American enrollment at historically white institutions has been
declining in the face of rising tuition rates. Such drops can have their own host of
negative side effects for the students who remain.
For African American students, declining numbers translate into increased racial
isolation in predominantly white classrooms, residence halls, cafeterias, libraries,
and the mostly white towns and cities in which many of these campuses are
located. Predominantly white campuses can often be alienating environments for
students of color. They are less likely to have interactions with faculty members
who are supportive of their classroom participation and academic
success…African American students also commonly report their experiences with
microaggressions, or the ‘subtle insults (verbal, nonverbal, and/or visual) directed
towards people of color automatically or unconsciously.101
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The Evidence for Racial Disparities
Minorities in Higher Education
More than ever before, becoming a successful member of the American
workforce requires a college education. Thus, it follows reasonably that to eliminate
disparities between white Americans and racial minorities and facilitate achievement for
all citizens, adequate access to postsecondary education is essential. According to a 2011
report by the American Council on Education Minorities in Higher Education, rates of
college enrollment have increased over the past several decades among all racial groups.
While superficially this appears to be good news, closer analysis revealed that the
disparity between African American enrollment and white enrollment actually widened
between 1990 and 2009 by two percentage points. African American enrollment also
increased at one of the slowest rates when compared to those of other racial minorities
such as Hispanics and Asian Americans.102 While whites and Asian Americans
demonstrated a higher level of achievement than their elders, African Americans did
not.103 With the knowledge that minorities have historically attained the lowest levels of
education, these groups should be targeted as groups whose access must be improved.

The Case for Reparations
An examination of the circumstances and policies that have created and
perpetuated racial disparity in American society grants nuance to the divisions seen in the
present day. While early policy solutions such as the Voting Rights Act of 1865 and
Brown v. Board of Education were intended to remedy the injustices of slavery in the
United States, new laws were often bent or broken by white Americans with greater
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political and social capital to such an extent that conditions improved little for African
Americans until the mid to late 1900s. Jim Crow laws, poll taxes, lynching, and other
horrors in the American South caused a mass exodus of nearly 6 million African
Americans to the North over the course of the 20th century known as the Great
Migration. Migrants believed they would find the equal legal protection granted them
under the 14th Amendment but in fact discovered they were trading one hell for another.
This new terror was encompassed in a single word: redlining. In his article for The
Atlantic The Case for Reparations, Ta-Nehisi Coates describes the plight of African
Americans seeking to become homeowners between the 1930s and 1960s:
The Federal Housing Authority had adopted a system of maps that rated
neighborhoods according to their perceived stability. On the maps, green areas,
rated ‘A,’ indicated ‘in demand’ neighborhoods that, as one appraiser put it,
lacked ‘a single foreigner or Negro.’ These neighborhoods were considered
excellent prospects for insurance. Neighborhoods where black people lived were
rated ‘D’ and were usually considered ineligible for FHA backing. They were
colored in red. Neither the percentage of black people living there nor their social
class mattered. Black people were viewed as a contagion. Redlining went beyond
FHA-backed loans and spread to the entire mortgage industry, which was already
rife with racism, excluding black people from most legitimate means of obtaining
a mortgage.104
With the home ownership movement of the 20th century came one of the most
concentrated accumulations of wealth in American history. However, redlining
effectively barred African Americans from stability of such asset acquisition, turning an
already wide wealth disparity between races into a veritable chasm. As Coates states, “If
you sought to advantage one group of Americans and disadvantage another, you could
scarcely choose a more graceful method than housing discrimination.”105
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Black Wealth/White Wealth
In their book Black Wealth/White Wealth, Melvin L. Oliver and Thomas M.
Shapiro describe the long-lasting effects of housing discrimination on the black
community. They found that “it generally takes years and years to accumulate substantial
wealth assets” and noted a “powerful connections between wealth accumulation and the
life cycle.”106 African American parents who were interviewed by the authors described
that their primary desire for their children was “to have the chance to get a good
education, to go to the right college, and to start their lives on the ‘right track.’ Assets
were viewed as crucial to fulfilling these desires.”107 And after centuries of
discrimination and a seemingly endless game of catch-up, who can blame them?
The Shape of the River
In their book, The Shape of the River: Long-Term Consequences of Considering
Race in College and University Admissions, authors William G. Bowen and Derek Bok
empirically look at the legacies left by race-conscious university admissions policies.108
Bowen and Bok utilized the College and Beyond database to study and observe long-term
education outcomes for over 45,000 students with a wide variety of racial identities.
These students all attended college at some point between the 1970s and 1990s. Their
study places particular emphasis on the paths of minority students admitted to top
universities as the result of race-conscious admissions policies, examining graduation
rates, academic performance, subsequent career success, and involvement in their future
communities. In short, their findings were that African-American students, the minority
group given the most attention, have performed well in the classroom, including
applicants with lower test scores that are admitted due to affirmative action admissions.

56

Additionally, the study found that in the absence of race-conscious admittance
policies, minority enrollment, particularly African American enrollment, would decline
dramatically. With their belief that these policies have been the stepping stone behind
creating the Hispanic and African-American middle classes in American society, their
conclusion is that without such policies in place, minority groups will remain
economically disadvantaged and have fewer avenues available to them for social and
economic mobility. An interesting finding of the study is that while these policies have
accounted for gains among minority groups due to reallocation of educational and
cultural capital, they have also causally affected a rise in minority test scores. In the long
term, these policies may not remain necessary but the study finds it evident that their
presence has beneficially contributed to the closing of the racial achievement gap. The
Shape of the River proves prescriptive because of its empirical insights into the efficacy
of race-conscious university admissions policies.109 While much of our analysis thus far
has been limited to theoretical ideas and concepts, validating these concepts through
collected and tangible data allows further analysis into potential policy interventions that
address disparities in the American educational system, particularly the realms of
academe represented by the field of higher education
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CHAPTER THREE: CRITICAL ANALYSIS
We have now examined a wide range of sources and perspectives regarding the
ontology and modality of racial identity within a multicultural democracy. Before moving
further, let us briefly review the events in question. In 2006, Michigan voters passed
Section 26, an amendment to the Michigan Constitution, via an established process for
popular referenda. Placed on the ballot as “Proposal 2,” the amendment passed by 58%
and prohibited Michigan’s public universities from employing any form of admissions
criteria that bore a racial focus. Members of the state boards that govern Michigan’s
public universities and select admissions criteria are elected for eight-year terms and have
historically made personal stances on racially-focused admissions criteria a part of their
campaign platforms. In the absence of ability to act on such views, racial groups are
precluded from lobbying these public officials regarding legislation that serves their
shared interests.
Proceeding forward we will utilize these references to critique the problematic
epistemologies employed by Justice Kennedy and the plurality ruling in Schuette v.
Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action. We will briefly return to a summary of Justice
Kennedy’s argument to identify particular points for redress. Kennedy finds “this case is
not about how the debate about racial preferences should be resolved [but] who may
resolve it.”110 Such a focus is not problematic. The question of when the polity is and is
not judged competent to rule itself lies at the very heart of Schuette. While both Kennedy
and Sotomayor seek to answer this query, vastly different rationales lead to their
opposing conclusions.
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Two major ideas serve as the backbone for Kennedy’s argument. The first of
these deals with interpretation of precedent rulings by SCOTUS, in which he finds the
Court historically has not and should not intervene in the absence of “specific injury”
against a minority group with malicious intent. Justice Kennedy determines that such a
motive has been present and active in historic precedent cases such as Hunter and Seattle
but does not find comparable purposive action to be present when evaluating the
modification of Section 26. As a result, the decisions made by the voters of Michigan
should not be restricted.
Secondly, the plurality ruling determines that true racism is stereotyping racial
groups to assume they have common political views. As he states in his opinion,
“government action that classifies individuals on the basis of race is inherently suspect
and carries the danger of perpetuating the very racial divisions the polity seeks to
transcend.”111 The conclusion in this case is that it would be racist and outside
appropriate jurisprudence to intervene when the intervention assumes any racial group to
possess a certain view. In the analysis that follows, we will seek to confront and
invalidate both objections respectively.
Point #1
The notion that invidious policies stemming from the nefarious motives of the
majority must certainly demand judicial intervention is without contest. Kennedy
categorizes these policies as causing real and specific injury to minority groups. Without
question, the precedent cases referenced by both Sotomayor and Kennedy deal with
historic, active discrimination. Their subsequent correction is to be lauded. Our task
remains to provide a convincing argument contrary to the conclusion of the plurality in
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Schuette: that precluding minority groups from meaningful participation in the political
process acts in itself to cause real and specific injury.
We will recall our earlier discussion of Ingram’s “status-driven group rights,”
those assigned to particular minority groups according to various racial, ethnic, gendered,
sexual, religious, and a multitude of other identities which may be subject to oppression
from a societal majority. These interests seek to promote equal treatment, which in some
cases involves treating every individual the same112 but in others require different
treatments for different group members to “respect individual difference no less than their
common humanity.”113 In contrast to oppression, domination is caused by “hierarchies of
decision-making power that prevent some persons from exercising control over their
lives”114 and may exist in many forms. Systemic versus identity-based social injustices
refer to injustice imposed in a way that any individual can be affected (i.e. poverty) or
because of individual/group identity, respectively. My argument in the case of Schuette is
that the actions of voters of Michigan have removed power from the hands of minorities
based on their particular group membership, meeting the identified definitions for
domination and identity-based social injustice.
Galtung’s theories of structural violence run complementary to this defined
framework. We will recall that structural violence is understood as existing when the
autonomy of a group or individual is limited in such a way that full potential or desired
outcomes for one’s life cannot be pursued. Further, such active injury is accomplished
through an actor, an object being acted upon, and the action itself. In the case of Schuette
we see all three functional components of structural violence at work. The people of
Michigan, serving as the actor, actively limited the capability of minority groups, the

60

objects acted upon, from advocating for their particular desired outcomes in higher
education through popular referendum, the action itself.
Worth noting here is Hamer and Lang’s discussion of structural violence in the
university setting, which demonstrates that minority groups face pervasive and unique
challenges even when granted race-conscious consideration for admission.
Microaggressions on campus and lack of adequate resources make academic achievement
more difficult for African Americans than their white peers. It is evident, then, that when
African American’s enter the context of higher education they face significant obstacles,
yet the Michigan referendum functions to create even more obstacles for these students to
arrive in the first place for them to get there in the first place. If the stated goal is a
harmonious society, Schuette appears to be working backwards by creating rather than
alleviating the structural violence that surrounds race and the American university.
Point #2
Certainly it would be erroneous to assume every member of a particular racial
group possesses identical worldviews. Intersection of the racial identity with class,
gender, religion, sexual orientation, and a variety of other lived experiences informs our
perceptions of the world around us and helps determine the desired outcomes Galtung
describes. The plurality in Schuette shares this viewpoint, recognizing the human
identities to be complex. Kennedy sees assumptions founded upon a single dimension of
an individual as both reductionist and deterministic. In many cases, such an outlook is
applicable and worthy of praise. A multitude of individual attributes such as music taste,
propensity towards crime, or vocational interest cannot be traced to one’s racial identity.
Similarly, individual ideologies, be they of political, religious, or another nature, are not
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homogenous across minority groups. These views of the plurality have merit. However,
our argument proceeding forward is to show that, in spite of the reasoning above, not all
assumptions made about racial groups need be considered racist, specifically the
assumption that minority groups desire access to higher education.
Returning to Ingram, we will recall his discussion of the appropriate definition of
“equal treatment.” Ingram finds two available definitions, one advocating for treating
every individual the same and one insisting treating all equally may not mean a strategy
of “sameness.” The latter finds as its basis the existent differences in society and it is this
definition we will advocate for.
Without question, race informs the manner in which the individual or group
participates in the American political process. We saw this in Waldon’s Cultural Identity
and Civic Responsibility, where he describes identity politics as a complex network of
group interactions which determine the manner in which a society’s resources are
allocated. Zamani-Gallaher took us a step further in her examination of racial identity
construction. Individuals perceive themselves through the process of categorization.
Identified boundary markers create commonality and difference between certain
members of a society. Consequently, in-groups and out-groups emerge as the social
collective subdivides along these categorical lines. With a myriad of potential identity
markers, a vast spectrum of diversity emerges in a multicultural democracy. One of the
most pronounced identity markers around the world is phenotypic difference between the
races. Because race is a socially constructed category, and no genetic or biological
difference exists between individuals, one might assume Kennedy’s notion of treating all
with a strategy of “sameness” to be just and reasonable. Zamani-Gallaher makes an
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important distinction, in her point that identities are constructed within the context of a
given nation and culture.
Thus, when we make assumptions about the shared goals of minority groups, we
take into account the shared histories and lived experiences of this group within its given
national context. The Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s serves as an example of a
racial group mobilizing around its shared goals in a manner that effected systemic
change. We will recall Bonilla-Silva’s theory of racial contestation, which holds overt
protest by minority groups to be of tantamount importance in the pursuit of structural
change. We cannot, and must not, question the valid and proven possibility of a minority
group identifying a salient issue or cause and sharing in its pursuit. Moreover, because
discrimination and disparity have a near universal affect on African-Americans, we see
that goals relating to the eradication of structural obstacles associated with BonillaSilva’s “New Racism,” in fact must be shared.
Without collective and cohesive mobilization by minority groups through over
advocacy or protest, transformative change in our flawed social fiber cannot be realized.
In response to the plurality’s view, it is permissible to view the many aspects of
individual identity as existing outside of, and independent from, arbitrary racial
categories – this is beneficial. However, when these arbitrary categories directly impact
and influence the lived experiences of all the individuals whom they contain, structural
violence occurs when the ability of minority groups to choose a shared, salient policy
pursuit is legally suppressed by the mechanizations of majority tyranny. The argument of
this paper is that the people of Michigan created further structural barriers that tangibly
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disadvantage minority groups by removing their access to racial contestation in a higher
education system already plagued by racial disparity.
Schuette v. The Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action: Was Justice Served?
Moving forward from the above argued rebuttal of the Schuette plurality’s
problematic philosophies, we are ultimately left with the question of whether appropriate
jurisprudence was exercised in the case of Schuette v. The Coalition to Defend
Affirmative Action. The argument of this paper seeks to respond to this question with a
resounding “no” for the following reason. The passage of Section 26 violates the
political-process doctrine, the idea that all societal groups should have equal access to
participation in the political process. Justice Sotomayor argues that many SCOTUS
precedent cases have reaffirmed both this doctrine and “the right of minority members to
participate meaningfully and equally in the political process” (citation). Examining the
cases of Hunter and Seattle, the Court has specifically stated that policy interventions
enacted by the popular majority that place “special burdens on racial minorities within
the governmental process” such that it becomes “more difficult for certain racial
minorities to achieve legislation in their interest” are in violation of the Constitution. This
paper seeks to affirm Justice Sotomayor’s argument that Section 26 “alters the political
process in a manner that uniquely burdens racial minorities” and agree that SCOTUS
precedent points towards a necessary overturning of the 2006 decision by the people of
Michigan.
This paper is not designed to merely match precedent and Constitutional verbage
with a logical verdict. Instead, my argument seeks to lay a theoretical foundation for why
the Schuette ruling should be perceived as injustice. Unjust action equates to deeper
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issues than mere misreading of precedents and our review of scholarly research
surrounding the subjects of race and its role in a multicultural democracy demonstrate
this. We will recall our earlier review of the works of Aristotle and the Doctrine of the
Mean, which seeks to restore equitable balance when restructuring or theft creates
disparity between parties. It is the idea that all should receive their “given due.” As may
be seen in Michigan, Section 26 represents a nonneutral reallocation of power between
racial groups that requires rectificatory justice to restore appropriate balance and
protection under the political-process doctrine. In Politics, Aristotle delivers the analogy
of the flautist, advocating that while all flute players may not be equal in merit or talent,
all should have equal access to flute lessons and education. The political-process doctrine
serves as a corollary; while equal outcomes are certainly not guaranteed, the right to
equal access and participation is to be defended in an equitable and just society.
The immense necessity of enshrining the access of minority groups to political
participation arises when we are able to objectively observe the continuing effects of
racial disparity in American society. Bonilla-Silva’s discussions of New Racism show
lingering structural violence and discrimination by social institutions against minority
groups. Protecting the rights of minorities to engage in racial contestation provides the
channels which can be effectively employed to effect systemic change in the social fabric
of the United States. The passage of Section 26 by the people of Michigan and
subsequent ruling by the plurality in Schuette v. The Coalition to Defend Affirmative
Action seals off these channels and prevents disenfranchised groups from pursuing the
equality granted to them by the Constitution. In response to this ruling, we must
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respectfully disagree and advocate for prompt reassessment of the ideologies which
contributed to its conveyance.
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